South Carolina Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 4

Article 4

1963

Sherman Act and American Subsidiaries Abroad
Andre Simmons
University of Nevada

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Simmons, Andre (1963) "Sherman Act and American Subsidiaries Abroad," South Carolina Law Review:
Vol. 15 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Simmons: Sherman Act and American Subsidiaries Abroad

SHERMAN ACT AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIARIES
ABROAD
ANDRE SIMMONS, PH.D.*
In recent years an increasing number of American corporations have established subsidiary companies located in foreign
countries. The reasons behind this trend have been numerous
and differed probably in each case. In most cases, however,
the main reasons for establishing subsidiaries abroad was the
desire to jump over the local tariff wall, to secure cooperation
of local capital, to take advantage of lower labor cost, or to
acquire new markets. This policy of locating subsidiary companies abroad has been especially noticeable in Latin America
and on the Continent of Europe within the area of the Common Market. Although from the economic and political point
of view the extention of the operation of the United States
corporations abroad will, in all probability, be advantageous
and beneficial to all participants, nevertheless this extention
may bring new complications as far as the application of our
antitrust policy is concerned.
To a large extent unnoticed, during the postwar years a
new development took place in the application of the Sherman
Act to American foreign economic relations. For the first
time since its enactment the Sherman Act was applied in
cases involving the parent-subsidiary relation where the subsidiary was located abroad. This new development was welcomed with great satisfaction by some people while others
greeted it with increasing apprehension and concern, fearing
that this new step taken by the Department of Justice and
the courts might lead towards undermining the whole concept
of multi-corporate enterprises and that at the same time it
was contrary to our policy of stimulating the export of capital.
A closer analysis of the leading cases will indicate conclusively
that most of those fears and apprehensions were unwarranted
and without much foundation.
In a relatively short period of time a number of cases in
which the issue of foreign subsidiaries was the focal point
of the alleged violations appeared before the courts. There
*Assistant Professor, Business Administration & Economics, University of Nevada.
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were three major cases, each of them dealing with a somewhat
different type of subsidiary. Each will be presented and discussed in turn.
The case which became most widely quoted, and misquoted,
and which had the widest possible repercussions was that of
Timken Roller Bearing Co.' The novelty of the Timken case
was partly due to the fact that it was based on a newly developed concept of intra-enterprise conspiracy, a concept
which was introduced by the courts into several cases dealing
with domestic markets. In order to appreciate fully the meaning of the Timken case a short discussion of the gradual development of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is essential.

I
The first case adjudicated by courts which involved the
concept of the intra-enterprise conspiracy was the General
Motors Corporationcase in 1941.2 The Department of Justice
alleged that General Motors Co. and General Motors Sales
Corp. created their own wholly owned subsidiary - General
Motors Acceptance Corp. - which dealt with financing the
sales of General Motors cars. According to the evidence General Motors Co. forced all of its car dealers to finance their
sales only via General Motors Acceptance Corp. The court
found General Motors Co. guilty of precluding competition in
the business of financing the sales of cars and found General
Motors guilty of illegal conspiracy to restrain trade. The
court said:
Nor can the appellants enjoy the benefits of separate
corporate identity and escape the consequences of an
illegal combination in restraint of trade by insisting that
they are in effect a single trader. The test of illegality
under the Sherman Act is not so much the particular
form of business organization effected, as it is the presence or absence of restraints of trade.8
A few years later the courts decided the famous A & P Co.
case in which the Department of Justice charged the A & P
Co. with an illegal conspiracy with its wholly owned sub1. United States v. Timiken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593, 95 L.Ed.
1199 (1951).

2. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
3. Ibid. at 404.
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sidiary ACCO, established by the A & P Co. for the sole purpose of centralizing the purchase of fresh vegetables and
fruits.4 The courts found the A & P guilty of violating the
Sherman Act.
Before the Court of Appeals decided the A & P Co. case,
however, the Supreme Court dealt in 1944 and 1948 with two
cases involving the motion picture industry. 5 In both of these
the Supreme Court found an illegal conspiracy between the
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries and it
ordered the dissolution of those multi-corporate enterprises.
Commenting on the corporate relation between the conspirators in the Schine case the Supreme Court said that the concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and
its directors was "a conspiracy which was not immuned by
reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated
rather than independent.' 0 In the above-mentioned case the
Supreme Court repeated what it had said in 1947 in the
Yellow Cab case:
The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or
absence of any unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from among
those who are affiliated or integrated under a common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent.... The corporate interrelationship of the conspirators, in other words, are not deter7
minative of the applicability of the Sherman Act.
The above statement was probably the clearest and the most
unequivocal expression of the Supreme Court's opinion that
in determining the illegality of a case the form of an organization actually plays a less important role than do the actual
policies, actions, and behavior of the enterprise.
Six months prior to the Timken decision, the Supreme Court
dealt with another case involving intra-enterprise conspiracy
and again, finding the defendant guilty of conspiring with its
subsidiaries, it stated that "common ownership and control
4. United States v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949).
5. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 92 L.Ed. 1245
(1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 81 L.Ed.
160 (1944).
6. 334 U.S. 110, 116, 92 L.Ed. 1245, 1251 (1948).
7. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227, 91 L.Ed. 2010,
2018 (1947).
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does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws."8'
All decisions of intra-enterprise conspiracy so far mentioned
had several things in common. In the first place they all dealt
with restraints which affected only the relation between the
defendant and its co-conspirators on the one hand and third
parties on the other hand. None of the holdings implied any
illegal restraints of trade between the defendant and its cospirators. The Timken case was the first and so far the only
case where the restraints upon competition between the parent
company and its own subsidiaries abroad were considered to
be an illegal conspiracy. In the second place, in all these cases
the defendant was a leader of the industry, its relative and
absolute size being overwhelmingly greater than the size of
its competitors. Finally, all cases except Timken involved
wholly owned subsidiaries.
II
The cases of intra-enterprise conspiracy when looked upon
from the economic point of view present at first sight a
rather puzzling and strange picture. It appears that courts
rigorously applied the concept of a corporation as a legal
entity and considered each corporation as a separate and
totally independent unit. Such an approach to a multicorporate enterprise apparently ignored the economic view of a
multicorporate organization as a single profit maximizing
unit, that is, one enterprise. To consider each corporation in
such an organization as a completely independent unit was to
ignore the economic facts of life, and to attach too great a
role to legalistic labels.
It has been suggested, however, that on second thought the
cases of intra-enterprise conspiracy which had been presented
so far in the courts were not so simple as might have appeared.0 Considering the fact that in each case the defendant
was a firm of preponderant size, it appears that the Department of Justice, by utilizing the concept of conspiracy, was
actually attacking the size - that is, the excessive economic
power - of the defendant. Furthermore, when the behavior
8. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. T. E. Seagram & Son, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215,
95 L.Ed. 219, 224 (1951).
9. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 74368 (1950); Chain Stores under the Sherman Act, 48 COL. L. REV.
786-99 (1947).
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of the defendants in each case is analyzed, one may easily and
quickly conclude that invariably the defendant employed policies and practices which could be labelled as predatory and
unfair methods of competition. It appears, then, that in the
concept of intra-enterprise conspiracy the Department of
Justice found a handy weapon with which to attack size as
such. At the same time the courts, although always employing
a very strict legalistic approach, actually did consider, though
implicitly, the facts of economic reality. Upon closer examination it appears that most economic experts would agree that
in all cases the actual position and behavior of the defendant
would indicate monopolization and a verdict of guilty, even
without bringing in the charge of conspiracy.
The history of the enforcement of the Sherman Act shows
conclusively that the attack upon size, as such, has probably
been the most difficult way to achieve a victory in court.
Having this in mind, the Department of Justice decided to
embark upon an easier road; it chose to charge conspiracy.
It used it on several occasions against domestic violations of
the act, and in the Timken case it tried its use in the case
involving foreign subsidiaries. It is well known to any student
of antitrust that the charge of conspiracy has been used as
being the most effective method in convincing the courts and
the easiest way to attain the verdict of guilty. This attitude
of courts towards the charge of conspiracy may be explained
to a great extent in terms of tradition. Under the common
law monopoly as such was never illegal - only combining
and conspiring to monopolize was illegal. Even after the
Sherman Act was on the statute books the conspiracy approach prevailed. The first section of the Sherman Act required conspiracy to declare an action illegal; it was only the
second section which declared monopolizing, even without conspiracy, that is, by one person, as illegal. The second section,
however, has been used in recent decades only on two occasions.10 This traditional approach to the concept of illegal
monopoly was reinforced in 1911 by the introduction of the
rule of reason. Since then, and until very recent years, the
courts consistently applied a dual standard to the antitrust
cases. They used the hard weapon of illegality per se in cases
of loose combinations where conspiracy was present, while
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F.Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
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at the same time employing the soft and delicate approach
via the rule of reason to the question of excessive economic
power. When these considerations are kept in mind it is really
not surprising that the Department of Justice in its attempts
to get convictions of the defendants on several occasions employed the conspiracy approach to the alleged violations of
the Sherman Act.

The attack on domestic monopolies via the charge of intraenterprise conspiracy was soon extended to the parent-subsidiary arrangement in foreign trade. The case selected first
was that of Timken Roller Bearing Co., where the application
of the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy as developed
gradulally in the cases mentioned above was pushed probably
to its extreme.
What made the Timken case different from all previous
decisions involving this new concept of conspiracy was the
fact that, in the first place, it involved foreign trade and subsidiaries located abroad; and, in the second place, the doctrine
of intra-enterprise conspiracy was used for the first time
with reference to a horizontal combination and to restraints
of competiion between the parent company and its subsidiaries.
The restraints of trade of third parties were not the crucial
issue. The Timken case was also the first case where the
parent had only a minority stock ownership, while all previous
cases of intra-enterprise conspiracy involved wholly owned
subsidiaries.
The Timken decision, in spite of all its complexity and
misunderstandings, firmly established the conclusion that a
parent-subsidiary relation in foreign trade does not offer an
escape route to the violation of the Sherman Act and that a
subsidiary which is established as a cover and a substitute
for the restraints previously effected by a cartel-like agreement may constitute an antitrust violation. The evidence
showed conclusively that Timken used the corporate device,
and organized its subsidiary in Great Britain in order to
perpetuate the elimination of competition between itself and
its former British competitors. As far as the question of
legality of subsidiaries was concerned, the decision of the
Supreme Court indicated that the subsidiaries organized

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss4/4

6

Simmons:
Act and
American Subsidiaries
1963] SHERMAN
ACT,Sherman
AMERICAN
SUBSIDIARIES
ABROAD Abroad
761
jointly by an American corporation in cooperation with its
competitors in their own country were not immune from

prosecution under the Sherman Act. The form under which
the restraints were effected was, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, less important than the nature and the magnitude of those restraints. The conclusion drawn by some observers that the decision of the Court declared any foreign
subsidiary illegal was obviously erroneous, and the panic
which apparently resulted among some members of the American business community abroad was totally uncalled for.1
The Timken case involved one type of subsidiary, namely
that established by an American corporation together with
foreigners, who were the nationals of the country where the
subsidiary was located. A completely different type of subsidiary was involved in the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. case, which appeared in court at approximately
the same time as the Timken case. 12 The Minnesota Mining
case dealt with subsidiaries abroad established jointly by
several American corporations without any participation of
foreign capital.
This case dealt with two issues; one involving jointly owned
factories abroad and the other involving an export association
created under the Webb-Pomerene Act. Here the attention
will be centered only on the legality of subsidiaries owned
jointly by a group of major American producers.
The Department of Justice alleged that in 1929 the following major producers of coated abrasives - Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co., Behr-Manning Corp., The Carborundum Co., and Armour and Co. - combined and organized (1)
Durex Abrasives Corp., and Export Association set up under
the Webb Act, and (2) Durex Corp., a holding company which
became the center of control of all foreign assets belonging
to the defendants. Both Durex corporations had the same
persons serving as officers and directors. It is important to
note that all these companies taken together produced a very
large proportion of coated abrasives in the United States,
that each of them was engaged extensively in export trade,
11. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monop-

oly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. lst Sess. 1729, 1856
(1955).
12. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.Supp. 947
(D. Mass. 1950).
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and that prior to this 1929 agreement they competed with each
other on domestic and foreign markets.
Immediately following the 1929 agreement, which set up the
Export Association and the Durex Corp., this corporation
acquired plants producing coated abrasives in Great Britain,
Canada, and Germany. At the same time a patent pool was
established by the Durex Corp. which obtained all foreign
patents of all defendants. Those patents were to be sublicensed to the foreign subsidiaries owned by Durex Corp. A
situation thus developed that a number of plants producing
coated abrasives in Great Britain, Canada, and Germany were
owned by the Durex Corp., which in turn was owned by four
major producers of those abrasives in the United States. It
may be said then that, for all practical purposes, those four
major producers jointly owned a number of subsidiaries
abroad.
The government alleged that in the 1930's a series of agreements were made between the Durex Corp. and the Export
Association which stipulated that the Export Association,
which centralized all export trade of its members, would cease
to export coated abrasives to the territories belonging to the
British Empire, and that these areas would be supplied by
Durex's subsidiaries in Great Britain and in Canada. After
1946 the whole continent of Europe was added to Durex's
subsidiaries in Great Britain as their territory to which, subsequently, no export from the United States took place. It
was shown that after those agreements had been made the
business of Durex's subsidiaries abroad increased substantially
while the exports of the Export Association were greatly reduced. The Department of Justice then started action against
the Durex Corp., the Export Association, and the four major
producers in the United States who owned these subsidiaries
and charged them with conspiracy to restrain United States
foreign trade.
The defendants admitted all the facts but claimed that they
were forced to establish subsidiaries abroad in order to overcome the political and financial difficulties connected with
export and import trade. They maintained also that as economic restrictions abroad prevented imports of coated abrasives from the United States, their subsidiaries abroad could
not be accused of restraining American export trade of coated

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss4/4

8

1963] SHERMAN ACT, AMERICAN SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD
763
Simmons: Sherman Act and American Subsidiaries Abroad

abrasives. The opinion of the court, as presented by Judge
Wyzanski, stated that if the claims of impossibility of exporting from the United States were true, then "any private
action taken to secure . . . business . . . does not restrain
foreign commerce in that area in violation of the Sherman
Act."' 3 The evidence proved however, that
nothing in the case can justify a finding of fact that if
defendants had not themselves established joint foreign
factories it would have been legally or economically impossible to sell at some profit a substantial volume of
defendants' American-made coated abrasives.
In short this Court finds . . .that defendants' decline
in exports to the United Kingdom is attributable less to
import restrictions of that nation.., than to defendants'
desire to sell their British-made goods at a large profit
rather than their American-made goods at a smaller
14
profit.
The above statement plus some further elaborations on it
made by the court, if taken in isolation, could and probably
would mean that the court favored the export of final goods
in preference to export of capital. It would also mean that
the establishment of producing facilities abroad was illegal
because by its very nature it restricted some exports of final
goods from the United States. Furthermore, it could mean
that any agreement between the parent company and its subsidiaries was illegal. The conclusions which could have been
drawn from the court's opinion so far sound very like some
of the conclusions drawn from the Timken case.
Fortunately, however, the court did not stop here. On page
962 of the opinion it unequivocally stated that it was not
attacking the restraints of competition between the parent
companies and their subsidiaries but that it attacked the fact
that the subsidiaries abroad were established jointly by leading United States producers. The court explicitly stated that if
each defendant established its own subsidiaries abroad no
charge of restricting United States exports would be made.
"Indeed the decree to be entered in this case will expressly
contemplate allowing just such individual operation of foreign
factories," said the Judge.' 5 Commenting on the fact that
13. Ibid. at 958.

14. Ibid. at 960.

15. Ibid. at 962.
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production abroad may be more remunerative than exports
from the United States, the court stated that financial advantage is a legitimate consideration for an individual nonmonopolistic enterprise; however, "it is irrelevant where the
action is taken by a combination and the effect . . . restricts
American commerce."' 16 An aggravating factor in this case
was the fact that all the defendants were major firms in the
industry and that, considered jointly, they completely dominated the whole abrasives industry in the United States.
The essence of the issue in the Minnesota Mining case was
the fact that the subsidiaries were owned jointly by the
dominant firms. This resulted, then, in two kinds of restraints. In the first place it restrained the export trade of
the defendants. In the second place the court believed that
"the intimate association of the principal American producers
in day-to-day manufacturing operations . . . may inevitably
reduce their zeal for competition inter sese in the American
market."' 7 In conclusion, the court seemed to attach great
weight to this last type of possible restraint, and stated that
joint foreign factories owned by leading producers "like joint
domestic price fixing would be invalid per se because they
, * . restrain competition in the American market.' 8 The
court, therefore, ordered the dissolution of the Durex Corp.
and enjoined the defendants from jointly owning subsidiaries
abroad.
According to some sources, the implication of the Minnesota
Mining decision seemed to be that any association of dominant
American producers to establish jointly subsidiaries abroad
was illegal per se mainly because it tended to reduce competition among them in the domestic market, even if there were
no detrimental effects upon United States foreign trade.' 9 In
view of what the court stressed in its opinion, such a conclusion sounds quite plausible.
Although the court was certainly correct about the possible
restraints upon the domestic market, its reasoning about the
restraints exercised on the export trade of the defendants
seems to have somewhat doubtful validity on purely economic
16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. at 963.
18. Ibid.

19. Dean, ExtraterritorialEffects of the United States Antitrust Laws,

A.B.A. REP. 93 (1957).
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grounds. What the court said in several places amounts in
effect to concluding that export of final goods is to be preferred over the export of capital. 20 Such a statement certainly
has no economic validity and is contrary to our long-established policy of stimulating the export of capital and by doing
so to promote economic development of foreign countries. The

court should have realized that in order to get a complete
picture of the situation one has to place against the unquestionable reduction of American exports of final goods which
may result in the short run from the fact that subsidiaries
were set up abroad, the undeniable advantages which accrue
to the United States economy from those foreign investments.
It is obvious that to consider only the reduction in exports of
final goods while neglecting the private and social benefits
resulting from the export of capital actually amounts to an
undermining of the whole philosophy of foreign investments.
It is rather regrettable that the court showed a tendency to.
overlook this side of the problem and concentrated instead
on analyzing only one aspect of the issue.
IV
The Timken and Minnesota Mining cases represented two
different types of subsidiaries; but there is still another type.
This is a situation in which an American company joins with
a foreign company to create a jointly owned subsidiary in a
country which is foreign to both partners. Subsidiaries of
this kind were involved in the Imperial Chemical Industrie
case which was adjudicated in 1951 with a supplementary
decision presented in 1952.21 Parenthetically it may be mentioned that this case became internationally famous and that
its epilogue took place in courts in London. 22
The ICI case was probably one of the most formidable
cases in the entire history of antitrust enforcement. The case
was under investigation for several years before it came to
court; it took several months before Judge Ryan could make
findings of facts and formulate his opinion. The evidence
presented by the Department of Justice consisted of over 3,500.
exhibits printed in thirty large-sized volumes. The magnitude
of the case should really not be surprising; it covered more
20. 92 F.Supp. 947, 961-962 (D. Mass. 1950).
21. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F.Supp. 215.
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
22. [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.); [1954] 3 All E.R. 88 (Ch.).
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than fifty years of the activities of the chemical industry in
almost all parts of the world.
The charges were brought against the Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., Imperial Chemical Industries (New York),
Ltd., and E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co., alleging a conspiracy to divide world markets into exclusive areas and to
eliminate competition in the manufacturing and marketing of
chemical products. The conspiracy was achieved by agreements, contracts, patent assignments, and the establishment
of jointly owned foreign subsidiaries. The conspiracy started
in 1897, initially covering only the production of explosives
but gradually extending to all chemical products. At first the
cooperation between ICI and duPont was based on straightforward cartel agreements allocating exclusive territories to
each party. In subsequent years when it appeared to duPont
that an agreement of this type might be illegal under the
Sherman Act, the cartel arrangements took the form of patent
exchange or patent pool contracts. The purpose of those contracts was to eliminate competition between the ICI and
duPont companies, and to perpetuate the division of markets.
In the inter-war period also the IG Farbenindustrie A. G.
joined the agreement and received its share of the world
markets.
Simultaneously with extending their cooperation on the
basis of patent and process exchanges, ICI and duPont embarked on a new venture which would facilitate the continuation of their conspiracy. This new idea consisted in creating a
jointly owned (usually 50-50) subsidiary in a territory where
ICI and duPont previously competed with each other. The
first subsidiary so created was the Canadian Explosives, Ltd.,
in 1911. As the same pattern was to be repeated in subsequent
years in several other countries, it is important to examine
some details of this first new venture in Canada.
Prior to 1911, duPont and the predecessors of ICI competed with each other on the Canadian market. After Canadian Explosives, Ltd., was established, both duPont and
ICI assigned to it all their Canadian patents, signed an agreement not to sell directly on the Canadian market, sold their
Canadian plants to this new jointly owned subsidiary, and
agreed that it should buy its raw materials in equal shares
from ICI and duPont. A new agreement signed in 1936 ex-
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plicitly stated that the "exploitation in Canada of the products
of ICI and duPont should be conducted through Canadian
Industries, Ltd.," exclusively. At the same time the Canadian
subsidiary was limited in its operations to the Canadian
market and was not allowed to export from Canada.
A similar pattern of cooperation between duPont and ICI
was repeated in 1921 in Chile, in 1927 in Australia, in 1934
in Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, and in 1938 in Brazil.
It is essential to remember that the creation of subsidiaries
in these countries did not open any new markets. Prior to
establishing their subsidiaries there both ICI and duPont
were already producing and selling their products in those
markets and they competed keenly against each other. Commenting on this method of cooperation which was repeatedly
used by the defendants, the district court said:
We have found that the jointly owned companies were
means designed and used by duPont and ICI to avoid
and prevent competition between themselves and with
others in the non-exclusive territories .... We have found
that not only were they intended to affect the export
and import trade of the United States but that the limitations placed on duPont and other American companies
on the export to those jointly owned companies and the
restrictions placed on those companies with respect to
sales and exports by them to the United States did achieve
the purpose and the end for which they were organized.
... The operations of those jointly owned companies were
in violation of law.2 3
In its final statement the court stated that, based on the
previous decisions of the Supreme Court, the law is crystalclear: "A conspiracy to divide territories which affects
American commerce, violates the Sherman Act" in the same
24
way as price-fixing agreements do.
The opinion on facts in the ICI case was presented by the
court in 1951, but the opinion on remedies was presented by
judge Ryan several months later, in May, 1952.25 The purpose
of this supplementary opinion was to terminate, to prevent
revival, and to destroy effects of illegal agreements in such a
23. 100 F.Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
24. Ibid.
25. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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way that competition could be re-established with a minimum
of judicial supervision. Among many other things, Judge
Ryan ruled on foreign subsidiaries of ICI and duPont. After
repeating that the foreign subsidiaries were used by ICI and
duPont to accomplish the ends of an illegal agreement to
divide territories and restrain competition, Judge Ryan stated
that, considering all the circumstances, he saw no other alternative but to order divestiture of all jointly owned subsidiaries abroad:
Our purpose is to provide that duPont will be without
restraints to export in competition with ICI, that ICI
will be without restraints to import into the United States
in competition with duPont and that those foreign companies will be without restraints to export into the United

States and import from

it.26

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the
future Judge Ryan, stating explicitly that the formation of
subsidiaries in foreign countries is not in and of itself illegal,
said that "the wrong arises only from the formation of a
number of those jointly owned companies, all in conjunction
with the same potential competitor, with the purpose of dividing trade and commerce." 2 7 Probably anticipating some future allegations that by directing divestiture of those subsidiaries "we are extending this court's jurisdiction beyond
places over which United States has sovereignty," Judge Ryan
concluded that the decree of the court was not directed to
those foreign companies which were not defendants in court,
but was directed only to duPont and ICI, and it enjoined
them from continuing actions and practices which substantially affected United States foreign trade and which violated
United States law. 28 Judge Ryan was then far from asserting
2 9
a "judicial aggression," as some of his critics maintained.
There is no doubt that the practices involved in the case
of cooperation abroad between two competitors struck at the
very roots of competition. Instead of promoting competition
a joint venture of two companies breathed the spirit of accord
26. Ibid. at 238.
27. Ibid. at 241.
28. Ibid.at 237.
29. Whitney, Antitrust Law and Foreign Commerce, 11 RECORD op
N.Y.C.B.A. 135 (1956); Sources of Conflict Between International Law
and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J.661 (1954).
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between them, it divided markets and fixed profit shares. If
cooperation between competitors is allowed, then the nature
of the antitrust policy will have undergone a basic change. If
such a change is contemplated, however, the courts are not
the proper institution to make it. A specific mandate from
Congress would be required.
It has to be recognized, however, that there are certain
exceptional circumstances where cooperation between competitors is necessary in order to have any trade at all. The most
noted examples are the Arabian-American Oil Co. and the
Kuwait Petroleum Co., where several leading oil companies
were forced by the native rules to operate as a single unit.
It is easy to see, however, that similar circumstances where
cooperation is thrust upon potential competitors very seldom
arise.
V
In addition to the Timken, Minnesota Mining, and ICI cases
the issue of subsidiaries appeared in two other cases in the
postwar years. The first of these cases, dealing primarily
with a world-wide cartel in titanium pigments, was adjudicated in 1945.30 This cartel was built by the National Lead
Go. in cooperation with duPont, ICI, IG Farbenindustrie,
and a French corporation called Societe Industrielle du Titane,
known also as S.I.T. One of the measures used in accomplishing this world-wide control of the production of titanium
was a network of subsidiaries located in several foreign countries and owned either jointly by National Lead and duPont,
or by National Lead and its foreign partners.
The opinion of the court dwelt largely on the question of
its jurisdiction over the case. Once the bases for jurisdiction
were established, the main issues considered by the court were
those of patent exchange and other cartel agreements. The
problem of subsidiaries was considered only incidentally to,
the main issue of cartel arrangements. The court found,
however, that the device of subsidiaries was used as a tool for
dividing world markets into noncompeting areas, and it ordered National Lead and duPont to divest themselves of their
interests in all of their foreign subsidiaries. When, on appeal,
the case came to the Supreme Court, this Court accepted and
30. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 91 L.Ed. 2078
(1947).
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affirmed all findings of facts by the district court and affirmed the order directing the defendants to divest themselves
of some of their foreign investments, because it believed that
those "acquisitions were part and parcel of the territorial allocation agreements and probably were a necessary element in
the establishment of the territorial arrangements."' 1
The other case in which the question of foreign subsidiaries
was indirectly raised was the widely known case of the electric lamp Phoebus cartel, which was organized by General
Electric Co., with Westinghouse Electric Co., N. V. Philips
Fabricken of Holland, and others.3 2 In this case, decided by
the district court in 1949, the government alleged that G. E.
and other defendants conspired to monopolize and combined to
restrain United States domestic and foreign trade in the electric lamp industry. One of the methods employed by this conspiracy was the formation of a large number of foreign subsidiaries, most of them wholly owned by G. E. The subsidiaries were not, however, defendants in the case; they were
not served process. The court adopted here the attitude that
the subsidiaries were legal entities and, as they were located
abroad, they were outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
The fact that they were owned, directed, and controlled by
the General Electric Co., over which the court obviously did
have jurisdiction, was overlooked. Although probably correct
on legal grounds from the economic point of view such an
attitude of the court was without any foundation, to say the

least.
After the court found G. E. guilty of violating the Sherman
Act four years passed before the final judgment was entered. 33
The request of the Department of Justice that G. E. be ordered to divest itself of all of its interests in foreign subsidiaries was denied by the court. The court believed that such
an order of divestiture would be contrary to the United States
foreign economic policy, and that it would not contribute in
any appreciable way to the desired objective of promoting
competition on the American domestic market. The court believed that its orders regulating the exchange of patents and
future relations between G. E. and its foreign competitors
would provide sufficient safeguards guaranteeing the removal
31. 332 U.S. 319, 363, 91 L.Ed. 2078, 2107 (1947).
32. United States v. General Elee. Co., 82 F.Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
33. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
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of any restraints on competition. The court stressed the point
that the nature and purpose of foreign subsidiaries in this
case differed basically from the role the subsidiaries played
in the ICI case. There, the subsidiaries were specifically organized to restrain trade; here, they were primarily employed
as a means of penetrating a market and any restraints which
resulted were due more to the cartel arrangements than to
the existence of subsidiaries. Whether or not this was always
so remains an open question and a highly debatable one. The
clear-cut dividing line which the court drew between the 0. F.
case and the ICI case in reality was not always so clear and
well defined as the court would like us to believe. In spite
of the fact that the parent-subsidiary arrangements were declared illegal, G. E. was permitted to keep its foreign subsidiaries.
VI
An analytical review of the major cases involving foreign
subsidiaries leads to the following classification of foreign
subsidiaries:
1. A subsidiary organized by one American company in
cooperation with foreigners in their own country (e.g.,
Timken).
2. A subsidiary organized by one American company in
cooperation with foreigners in a third country (e.g.,
II and G. E.).
3. A subsidiary set up abroad jointly by a group of American producers (e.g., Minnesota Mining).
So far there had not been a clear-cut case involving a
wholly owned foreign subsidiary organized by a single American firm. In the G. E. case, where some of the subsidiaries
were wholly owned, the issues of cartelization and patents
were more important than that of subsidiaries. The ruling
therein cannot be applied to a simple case involving only a
subsidiary device and no other restraints. The Timken decision obviously would not apply to a case of a wholly owned
subsidiary, in spite of some of Justice Jackson's dicta.
It is difficult to say a priori how a case of a wholly owned
subsidiary would be adjudicated by the courts. There is the
possibility, although a rather remote one, that the courts might
apply the decision of the Yellow Cab case and consider the
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division of territory between parent and subsidiary as an
illegal restraint of trade. Against this not very likely chance
there stands a statement by the court in the Minnesota Mining
case that foreign subsidiaries wholly owned by one corporation are legal. Ordering the dissolution of the jointly owned
subsidiaries the court said that the decree to be entered in
this case would expressly permit operation of foreign factories by each individual defendant. As the chance of applying
the Yellow Cab decision is purely conjectural, and as it stands
against the explicit dictum of the Minnesota Mining case, it
may safely be assumed that a foreign subsidiary owned wholly
by one American corporation is perfectly legal. Such a conclusion is based not only on judicial precedent but also on economic common sense. To conclude otherwise would surely
mean to ignore the reality of conditions prevailing in our
modern business life in general, and in foreign trade in
particular.
The examination of the cases involving the issue of foreign
subsidiaries reveals a -number of definite conclusions. Although in all the cases discussed in this study the use of the
corporate device to establish a subsidiary was declared by the
courts as illegal, it appears unequivocal from the analysis of
the facts and from the evidence presented that the formation
and use of a foreign subsidiary as such should not be considered illegal. In all cases its use was made illegal by the environment in which it was utilized, by the purpose, and by
the effects which it generated upon United States domestic
and foreign trade. In all cases so far adjudicated by the courts
it was found that the subsidiaries were used as a mechanism
to perpetuate the restraints of trade and as a tool to effect
the elimination of competition. The evidence also indicated
that in all cases the illegal restraints and conspiracy antedated the creation of subsidiaries. It was, then, not the existence of a subsidiary as such which was illegal, but the use
to which the subsidiary was put. In the ICI case the court
plainly stated that "it is clear... that absent this wrongful
purpose or harmful effect there is nothing per se unlawful
in association or combination of a single American enterprise
with a single local concern in a foreign county in a jointly
owned manufacturing or commercial company to develop a
local foreign market."8 4
34. See note 23 supra, at 557.
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An additional and a very significant point at issue is that
in all cases the restraints were effected by a company which
had a dominant size in the domestic and foreign markets of
the United States. By attacking those big corporations the
Department of Justice really made an attack on size as much
as it did on conspiracy.
In the widely discussed Timken decision the problem of
intra-enterprise conspiracy was obviously misplaced. The
remedy suggested by the Court requiring competition between
the parent company and its subsidiaries was destined to be
unworkable. The simple solution could have been to dissolve
the whole multi-corporate organization. If some of the dicta
of the Timken case were taken literally it would mean a complete elimination of the use of subsidiaries in foreign trade.3 5
Fortunately, however, most authorities agree today that the
Timken decision was a unique one and will not be used as a
precedent. 36 To request competition among affiliates amounted
really to seeking violation of rationality of business behavior.
The second conclusion which may be drawn from an analysis
of the courts' decisions indicates that the courts so far have
shown very little understanding of the process of foreign investment. They seemed to imply on several occasions in the
Timken and Minnesota Mining cases that the export of goods
is to be favored over the export of capital, and that when
foreign investments are made they should not restrict the export of final goods. This implication, if correct, would obviously be contrary to economic rationality and against the
policy of developing foreign countries by exporting capital.
Professor Carlston believed that the courts tried "to set up
artificial legal forces which will protect foreign commerce in
goods as against the process of foreign investment."'3
The third conclusion emerging here is that a concerted
action of competitors abroad is subject to the same sanctions
of law as is their concerted action at home. That was plainly
demonstrated in the Minnesota Mining case. The Sherman
Act, as interpreted, does not permit domestic subsidiaries to
35. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
NationalAntitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 69 (1952).
36. Whitney, PlanningForeign Trade, How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAws 377 (1954); Linowitz, The International Businessman Meets
the Antitrust Laws, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 219 (1956).
37. Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 N. W. L. REv. 718 (1955).
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be owned jointly by competitors; such an arrangement is believed to restrain competition among them, amounts to a
division of markets, and is illegal. The same rule of illegality
applies to joint ventures abroad. Undoubtedly such a view
has great justification and is based on sound economic
grounds. No reasonable person can expect corporations X
and Y to cooperate closely abroad, and request at the same
time that they compete at home. Cooperation abroad will
eventually lead to cooperation and division of markets at
home.
When all facts are considered it may be concluded that the
courts have failed in a few instances to show a reasonably
correct and economically sound approach to the question of
foreign subsidiaries. It is true that the per se doctrine was
seldom, if ever, used and that within their limited resources
the courts did consider, on a few occasions, the relevant
economic and political factors which have had bearings on
American foreign economic relations. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that the courts made no mistakes and have left
themselves no room for improvement. On the contrary, it is
believed that there is an area where improvement in the
judicial approach may take place. In the first place the
concept of intra-enterprise conspiracy should be dropped,
especially when it applies to foreign trade. This concept
probably confuses more than it solves, and it is really unnecessary in prosecuting antitrust violations. Other equally
effective but more rational weapons could be used here. Instead of using the conspiracy charge, the Department of
Justice could use the excessive size approach as it did so
successfully in the Alcoa case.
There is room for improvement also in the treatment of an
even more significant issue, that concerning the case of a
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries. In the
General Electric case, the courts adopted the very rigid legal
fiction of each corporation as an independent entity and refused to see that, from the point of view of economic behavior,
all the subsidiaries plus the parent company actually constituted one enterprise. The courts refused to serve process
on those foreign subsidiaries on the grounds that they were
outside their jurisdiction. By doing so they completely overlooked the fact that the decision-making center of all those
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subsidiaries was located not in Europe or in Asia but in the
United States, in the Head Office of the General Electric
Company. Such an oversight is surely unjustified. It would
be advisable if the courts in addition to looking at the legalistic
labels would also consider the economic facts of life. It is to
be hoped that the approach displayed in the G. E. case will
not be repeated. Probably it will not, because it has already
been modified once in 1951 in the ICI case. In this case the
process was served on the ICI via its wholly owned subsidiary ICI (New York) which was found to be within the
jurisdiction of the United States. If it is permissible to serve
process upon the parent company via its subsidiaries, it is
even more logical to serve process upon the foreign subsidiaries via the parent company which is located in the United
States. It certainly would be a significant help in the successful prosecution of antitrust violations if the courts would
bridge the wide gap which today separates the concept of a
wholly owned subsidiary from the concept of a branch or a
department of a corporation. As there is really not much
economic difference between a wholly owned subsidiary corporation and a department, there seems to be no justification
to treat a subsidiary as a completely independent enterprise.
The third problem arising from the cases dealing with
subsidiaries poses the complex question: Is divestiture an
appropriate remedy? Here is an area of possible cofiflict between the need for divestiture of foreign assets in order to
eliminate a chance of recurrence of illegal restraints, and the
desirable policy of encouraging investments abroad. This
question posed a dilemma to the courts on several occasions.
Should the courts forego the opportunity of vigorously enforcing the antitrust laws so as not to harm American foreign
investments, or should they give preference to the Sherman
Act over the general principles of foreign economic policy?
The solutions to this dilemma offered so far are very inconclusive. In two cases (ICI and Minnesota Mining) the courts
ordered divestiture; in two other cases (Timken and G. E.)
they refused to do so; while in the fifth case (NationalLead)
they ordered only a partial divestiture.
Considering the fact that any antitrust action in the area
of foreign trade touches upon political, economic, military, and
diplomatic relations involving the United States and several
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foreign countries, it should be stressed that an antitrust action
in foreign trade should never be considered in isolation but
should always be related to wider aspects of our foreign relations. Specifically, all antitrust actions in foreign trade
should be coordinated with, and related to, the general objectives of our economic policies. No situation should ever
arise in which an antitrust action is contrary to the attainment of wider economic and political objectives of the United
States. The antitrust policy should always be applied only
within a wider framework of other foreign economic policies.
It is believed that the creation of a special Foreign Commerce Section within the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will contribute toward a more effective antitrust policy in cases dealing with subsidiaries abroad s8 It
is hoped that this section will coordinate the examination of
all aspects of each case, and will also harmonize our antitrust
policy with the general objectives of our overall foreign
economic policy.

38. Press release of the Department of Justice, published in Wall Street
Journal, Oct 30, 1962, p. 17, col. 3.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss4/4

22

